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Abstract 
This article uses the 1968–2007 waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to examine how work-
limiting disabilities influence the intragenerational earnings and income mobility of individuals. The results show 
that work-limiting disabilities increase the probability of downward mobility for several years after onset. 
Furthermore, the probability of being in the bottom portions of the distributions increases significantly, not only 
during the year of onset but also for at least 10 years afterwards. These results are more pronounced for those 
individuals suffering from a disability that is more chronic or severe in nature. Income from spousal earnings and 
government transfer payments offers some protection against disability’s adverse effect, with more protection 
being provided to those who are more chronically disabled. 
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I. Introduction 
Policy-makers have long been interested in the economic well-being of disabled individuals. Researchers have 
documented the negative impact that disability has on workers’ earnings and income (Stephens, 2001; 
Charles, 2003; Meyer and Mok, 2006; Mok et al., 2008). One area that has received little attention is how the 
onset of a work-limiting disability alters intragenerational earnings and income mobility. Many consider the 
disabled to be a disadvantaged group, and understanding their experiences helps in learning of the changing 
nature of inequality (Haveman and Wolfe, 1990). Given the disadvantaged nature of disabled individuals and the 
increasing enrolment in and spending on Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI) (Autor and Duggan, 2003, 2006), studying the relationship between disability and mobility is 
important.1 
Aside from long-term earnings/income losses, there are other reasons to expect that work-limiting disabilities 
should hinder movements within the distributions. Some researchers have found that the disabled experience 
wage discrimination (Johnson and Lambrinos, 1985; Baldwin and Johnson, 1994; DeLeire, 2001), suggesting that 
the onset of a disability should reduce a worker’s ability to move up the distributions when compared to 
nondisabled individuals. Furthermore, the SSDI and SSI application process may hinder work-disabled 
individuals’ mobility patterns. One of the main features of these programmes is that individuals must show that 
they are not capable of substantial gainful employment. As of January 2011, substantial gainful employment for 
those who are not blind meant earning $1000 per month or more (Social Security Administration). Therefore, as 
individuals apply for benefits, await initial decisions or appeal rejected claims, they may work less than they 
otherwise would have, had they not been seeking benefits.2 
While the above discussion implies a directional impact of disability on mobility, little research exists that 
calculates the magnitude of the effect. Nagi and Hadley (1972) show that after the onset of disability, the per 
cent of their sample with a monthly family income of $500 or more fell by approximately 31.7% points. The per 
cent of their sample with a monthly family income of $200 or less grew by 43.2% points. Bartley and Plewis 
(1997) show that men who move down socio-economic status groups are more likely, and those who move up 
socio-economic status groups are less likely, to report a long-term, limiting illness. The authors define socio-
economic status by occupational classifications and examine mobility between three 10 year periods, 1971, 
1981 and 1991. 
Meyer and Mok (2006) show that not only are the disabled more likely to live in poverty when compared to 
their nondisabled counterparts, but also the poverty rate among disabled individuals rises during the year of 
onset and does not return to pre-disability levels even 10 years afterwards. Burkhauser et al. (2008) use data 
from the Current Population Survey (CPS) and kernel density estimates to show that the economic well-being of 
working-aged, disabled individuals has remained stagnant despite growth in the SSDI and SSI programmes and 
despite the increases in economic well-being of other disadvantaged groups, such as single mothers. 
This study uses the 1968–2007 waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and begins by constructing 
transition probabilities and comparing the mobility patterns of disabled and nondisabled men. The study then 
uses interval regressions to calculate the long-term earnings and income losses associated with the onset of a 
work-limiting disability along with the probability that a disabled worker will be in one of the five quintiles of the 
earnings and income distributions relative to a nondisabled individual. Results from the analysis indicate that the 
onset of a work-limiting disability is associated with an increased probability of falling, and a decreased 
probability of rising, in the earnings and income distributions. This change occurs not only during the year of 
onset, but also lasts for at least 10 years. Disability hinders mobility in the earnings distribution more than that 
in the income distribution, providing evidence that other sources of income help mitigate disability’s negative 
impact; the protection is larger for the more chronically disabled. 
This article contributes to the existing literature by exploiting the panel-data nature of the PSID and tracking 
mobility patterns from a period of 3 years before disability onset to 10 years afterwards. The earlier literature 
used a two period transition matrix (Nagi and Hadley, 1972), three separate 10 year periods (Bartley and 
Plewis, 1997), or cross-sectional data from the CPS over multiple years (Burkhauser et al., 2008). By focusing on 
a 14 year period, researchers can gain a better understanding as to the changing nature of how disability 
influences mobility. Furthermore, the earnings equation that is used in the analysis makes use of a comparison 
group of nondisabled individuals, is well known in the programme evaluation literature and is similar to that 
used by Stephens (2001), Charles (2003), Meyer and Mok (2006), and Mok et al. (2008). The articles in the 
previous literature on disability and mobility do not use a comparison group explicitly in their modelling.3 Using 
these evaluation techniques, researchers can have relatively more confidence that the onset of disability is 
changing mobility patterns. 
The rest of this article proceeds by discussing the data and empirical methodology in Section II. Section III 
presents and discusses the empirical results, and Section IV concludes. 
Fig. 1. Estimated earnings losses by level of chronicity 
 
 
Fig. 2. Estimated income losses by level of chronicity 
 
 
II. Data and Empirical Methodology 
Data 
This study uses the 1968–2007 waves of the PSID, which were conducted annually from 1968 to 1997, and 
biennially thereafter. The unit of analysis is the male household head.4 Each individual must report being a 
current household head at least once from 1968 to 2007. Once the individual reports being a current household 
head, he must maintain this status for at least three more consecutive waves. This restriction ensures each 
person in the sample has the ability to contribute observations for multiple years. The analysis excludes males 
who first report being a current household head in the 2003–2007 surveys since they do not meet this 
restriction. The estimation uses an individual’s observation whenever he is between the ages of 20 and 62 and 
reports nonmissing annual labour earnings. 
A work-limiting disability is identified from a survey question asking, ‘Do you have a physical or nervous 
condition that limits the type of work, or the amount of work you can do?’5 This question was asked consistently 
from 1972 to 2007. Between 1969 and 1971, this question came in two parts, one asking about the amount of 
work and the other asking about the type of work. If a respondent answers affirmatively, then he is identified as 
experiencing a work-limiting disability in the calendar year before the survey (Stephens, 2001). The date of 
disability onset is taken as the first affirmative answer given by the respondent. Each individual must be a 
current household head in the two surveys prior to onset (Charles, 2003; Meyer and Mok, 2006; Mok et 
al., 2008). This requires all males first reporting a disability in 1968 and 1969 to be removed from the analysis.6 
To ensure that disabled males can contribute observations after onset, they must maintain household head 
status for three consecutive surveys after onset. This requires all males reporting their first disability past the 
2001 survey to be removed from the analysis. Those who are 18 years old or younger when they experience 
their first disability are removed from the sample (Charles, 2003; Meyer and Mok, 2006; Mok et al., 2008). Since 
the analysis focuses on males between the ages of 20 and 62, and since disabled individuals must be in the 
sample for 3 years past the date of onset, all men older than 59 years at onset are removed from the sample. 
To account for how chronic the disability is, an index is created following Stephens (2001): the total number of 
disability reports is added together and then divided by the total number of years the respondent is in the 
sample, starting with the year of onset. If the individual reports an index that is larger than or equal to 0.50, 
then he is labelled as most chronically disabled. If the index is lower than 0.50, then he is least chronically 
disabled. The equations presented below are estimated separately using different sets of disabled individuals – 
the entire sample, the most chronically disabled and the least chronically disabled. An obvious problem with this 
index is that if a disabled individual is in the sample for a short period, then he may be assigned a large weight, 
indicating that his disability is relatively chronic or severe even though it may only last for a brief time (Meyer 
and Mok, 2006). However, since all men reporting a disability must be in the sample for an additional 3 years, 
this bias should be mitigated.7 
Empirical methodology 
The analysis employs three methodologies, earnings equations, transition matrices and interval regressions. Jolly 
(2013) studies how job displacement impacts intragenerational mobility patterns using similar techniques. 
Therefore, the methodologies presented here on work-limiting disabilities build upon that earlier work focusing 
on job loss. 
Earnings regressions.  
To understand the impact of work-limiting disabilities on mobility, it is important to examine first how 
disabilities influence the earnings and income of individuals. To this end, the analysis begins with a fixed-effects 
earnings equation that is similar in style to that used by Stephens (2001), Meyer and Mok (2006), and Mok et al. 
(2008).8 The equation is 
𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝛾𝑡  +∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑠
𝑘  𝛿𝑘  + 𝛼𝑖  + 𝑖𝑡
𝑘≥−3
   
(1) 
Here, 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗  equals annual labour earnings or total family income of person 𝑖 in year 𝑡. Family income includes the 
taxable income and transfer income of all members in the family unit. It is adjusted for family size by dividing it 
by the square root of the number of members in the family unit.9 Family income, in addition to labour earnings, 
is used here since spousal earnings and government transfer payments may mitigate any negative impact 
disability has on the household head’s earnings. Earnings and income are converted to 2006 dollars using the 
appropriate year’s consumer price index for all urban consumers.10 
The 𝑥𝑖𝑡 contains a quartic in potential experience. Potential experience equals age minus education minus 
six.11 If individuals have fewer than 12 years of education, then potential experience equals age minus 18. This 
ensures that they are not overcompensated by assigning them larger values of experience (Stephens, 2002). 
Education is defined to be the same throughout time by assigning each individual his reported education from 
the most recent observation in the sample (Jolly, 2013). The 𝐷𝑖𝑠
𝑘  are disability dummy variables that equal one if 
individual 𝑖 reports disability onset in year 𝑠, and 𝑘 indexes these variables starting 3 years before onset. The 
estimates of 𝛿𝑘  provide the estimates of the long-term earnings/income losses associated with the onset of a 
work-limiting disability. The 𝛾𝑡 are year dummy variables. The term 𝛼𝑖 is a time-invariant, individual-specific, 
unobserved effect that is treated as a fixed as opposed to a random effect. Finally, 𝑖𝑡 is a time-varying error 
term, which is assumed to be distributed normally with mean zero and variance 𝛿𝜀
2. 
Transition matrices.  
Transition matrices provide estimates of the probability of individuals moving throughout the distributions over 
relative time changes and provide evidence as to how persistent are shocks to earnings and income 
(Burkhauser et al., 1997; Jolly, 2013). The probability of changing quintiles will be the same over a 1 year period 
as over a 3 year period if the shock is transitory. The probability of changing quintiles grows over time with 
persistent shocks. 
The quintiles of the distributions are generated using data over the entire sample period, 1968–2007.12 Once the 
quintiles have been determined, the sample is broken into two subsets, the first contains nondisabled men, and 
the second contains those individuals who report a work-limiting disability at some point between 1970 and 
2000. Using the same methodology and similar notation as Burkhauser et al. (1997) and Jolly (2013), indicator 
variables are created for each individual. These variables are defined as 𝜌𝐼,𝑞;𝑙
𝑡,𝑡+𝑟, and they equal one if 
individual 𝑖 moves from quintile 𝑞 to quintile 𝑙 between periods 𝑡 and 𝑡 +  𝑟. Then, the sub-sample’s probability 








      
(2) 
where 𝑤𝑖 is the sample weight assigned to individual 𝑖 in period 𝑡 +  𝑟. 
The base period, time 𝑡, is different for each sub-sample. For the group of disabled workers, time 𝑡 refers to the 
period of 3 years before onset. For the group of nondisabled males, the reference period is a randomly chosen 
starting year from among the number of years for which they are in the sample. The reason the reference period 
is different is that a disability can occur in any year from 1970 to 2000, which makes it difficult to align 
temporally disabled and nondisabled individuals. Therefore, a random reference period is chose for the 
nondisabled. 
Interval regression.  
The final methodology used is estimating interval regressions. This model begins with Equation 1 to estimate 
earnings and income losses as before, and then uses these estimates to calculate the probability that an 
individual will be in one of the five quintiles of the distributions. 
Starting with Equation 1, define the following formula 
𝑦𝑖𝑡  = {
1  𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗  ≤  𝜇1
2,… , 4 𝑖𝑓 𝜇𝑗−1  <  𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗  ≤  𝜇𝑗∀𝑗 =  2,… , 4
5 𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗  >  𝜇4
    
(3) 
Here, 𝑦𝑖𝑡  equals one of the five quintiles of the distributions, with one being the lowest quintile and five being 
the highest. The 𝜇𝑗  s are the lower and upper bounds of each quintile, which are fixed. To save on notation, 
define 𝑧𝑖𝑡𝜃 =  𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝛾𝑡  +  ∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑠
𝑘  𝛿𝑘𝑘≥−3    
and rewrite Equation 1 as 
𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗  =  𝑧𝑖𝑡𝜃 + 𝛼𝑖  +  𝑖𝑡 
(1’) 
By inserting Equation 1’ into Equation 3, with rearranging, Equation 3 becomes 
𝑦𝑖𝑡  =  {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑖𝑡  ≤  𝜇1  − (𝑧𝑖𝑡𝜃 + 𝛼𝑖)
2, … ,4 𝑖𝑓  𝜇𝑗−1 – (𝑧𝑖𝑡𝜃 + 𝛼𝑖)  <  𝑖𝑡  ≤  𝜇𝑗 – (𝑧𝑖𝑡𝜃 + 𝛼𝑖)∀𝑗 =  2,… ,4.
5 𝑖𝑓 𝑖𝑡  >  𝜇4 – (𝑧𝑖𝑡𝜃 + 𝛼𝑖)
 
Since 𝑖𝑡 is assumed to be normally distributed, then the probability that yit equals one of the five quintiles of 
the distributions is given by 






𝜇1 – (𝑧𝑖𝑡𝜃 + 𝛼𝑖)
𝜎𝜀
] , 𝑗 =  1
Φ [
𝜇𝑗 – (𝑧𝑖𝑡𝜃 + 𝛼𝑖)
𝜎𝜀
] −  Φ [
𝜇𝑗−1 – (𝑧𝑖𝑡𝜃 + 𝛼𝑖)
𝜎𝜀
] , ∀𝑗 =  2, … ,4
1 −  Φ [
𝜇4 – (𝑧𝑖𝑡𝜃 + 𝛼𝑖)
𝜎𝜀
] , 𝑗 =  5
 
(4) 
where Φ(. ) is the standard normal cumulative density function (CDF). 
The interval regression’s likelihood function is derived in the same manner as that of the ordered probit 
(Wooldridge, 2002). The only difference between the ordered probit and the interval regression is that with the 
former, the 𝜇𝑗  s are part of the estimation procedure, whereas with the interval regression, they are fixed, 
known parameters. The estimates from the likelihood function are used in Equation 4 to estimate the 
probability that a disabled individual will be in one of the five quintiles of the distributions relative to his 
nondisabled counterpart. 
As before, 𝛼𝑖 is treated as a fixed effect as opposed to a random effect. As in Jolly (2013), to account for fixed 
effects, the analysis follows Mundlak (1978) and parameterizes the relationship between 𝛼𝑖 and 𝑧𝑖𝑡 as 𝛼𝑖 =
 𝑧?̅?𝜆 + 𝑢𝑖, where 𝑧?̅?  is the observed variables’ time average for individual 𝑖, and 𝑢𝑖|𝑧𝑖~𝑁 (0, 𝜎𝑢
2). The 
coefficients associated with 𝑧?̅?  provide the effect that unobserved heterogeneity has on an individual’s earnings 
and income, whereas those associated with 𝑧𝑖𝑡 are interpreted as the effect the variable has on earnings and 
income. 
III. Results 
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the selected variables by disability status. For nondisabled men, the 
averages and proportions use each individual’s observation. The statistics for the disabled are calculated using 
observations of the 3 years prior to onset. There are 5008 nondisabled and 1559 disabled men in the sample. 
Those who experience a work-limiting disability tend to be older, less educated and African-American when 
compared to the nondisabled. They also tend to come from blue-collar occupations, have less labour earnings, 
lower family income and work fewer hours per year. Finally, the disabled tend to have more children under 18 
years of age, and their wives tend to be older than the wives of the nondisabled. Aside from working in blue-
collar occupations, these differences are more pronounced for the most chronically disabled. These statistics 
support what the previous literature (for example, Haveman and Wolfe, 1990) has shown and indicate that 
those individuals who do experience a work-limiting disability may be coming from economic groups that are 
relatively disadvantaged. 
Table 1. Summary statistics by disability status 
Variable Non disabled All disabled Least chronic Most chronic 
Age* 35.60 37.16 35.44 39.45 
Education* 13.23 11.93 12.31 11.42 
Black* 28.27% 32.98% 31.04% 35.55% 
Married 82.90% 82.31% 82.24% 82.42% 
Number of children under 18* 1.22 1.42 1.41 1.43 
Annual hours worked* 2188.18 2074.32 2152.51 1970.80 
Labour earnings* $513 26.99 $404 16.09 $432 63.42 $366 46.53 
Family incomea* $456 04.77 $353 53.62 $369 93.59 331 82.47 
Wife's Age* 34.31 35.52 33.99 37.54 
Blue collarb* 44.18% 54.11% 54.24% 53.95% 
Manufacturingb,c 24.93% 24.93% 25.35% 24.37% 
Sample size 5008 1559 886 673 
Notes: aAdjusted for family size using the square-root equivalence scale. 
bData not available past the 2001 survey wave. 
cData not available until the 1971 survey wave. 
* Indicates statistical significance between Non-Disabled and All Disabled at the 1% level using a two-tailed test. 
For variables Married and Manufacturing, the difference was statistically insignificant at any standard level. For 
disabled workers, averages are for the three years prior to the onset of the disability. For non-disabled workers, 
averages are for the entire time frame. 
Source: Author's calculations from the 1968–2007 PSID. 
 
Earnings and income losses of disabled workers 
Table 2 presents the estimates from Equation 1, the fixed-effects earnings equation. Since the disability 
variables are the ones of interest, they are the ones displayed in the table. The rows in column one are labelled 
‘3 Years Before’ to ‘10 Years After,’ and they indicate the number of years before or after the onset of the 
disability. The estimates are presented graphically in Figs 1 and 2. For all three samples of disabled men, 
earnings and income exhibit a slight downward trend during the 3 years before disability onset, which is 
consistent with the previous literature using the panel-data structure of the PSID (Stephens, 2001; 
Charles, 2003; Meyer and Mok, 2006; Mok et al., 2008). Meyer and Mok (2006) mention that this could be 
caused by individuals experiencing health problems prior to their actual report of a work-limiting disability, 
especially for those who are chronically/severely disabled. Focusing on all disabled workers, the results indicate 
that, on average, those who experience a work-limiting disability suffer a drop in earnings, equalling $1794, 
during the year of onset; this estimate is significant only at the 10% level. Labour earnings decrease by a larger 
amount, $4189, the year after onset. When using average earnings from Table 1, this loss amounts to 10% of 
pre-onset earnings. Even 10 years after disability onset, earnings are still $3822, or 9%, below where they would 
have been had the disability not occurred. Family income drops by $2463 the year after onset; the income loss 
grows to $3858 10 years afterwards. When taken as a percentage of pre-disability income, these losses amount 
to 7% and 11%, respectively. 
Table 2. Earnings and income regressions by chronicity 
  Labour earnings   Family income   
  All disabled Least chronic Most chronic All disabled Least chronic Most chronic 
3 years before 2044.56 2630.46 1318.69 1705.51 1829.44 1629.36 
  (1.94)* (1.57) (1.29) (1.61) (1.07) (1.65)* 
2 years before 1067.70 1593.03 455.68 610.871 1085.27 109.121 
  (1.15) (1.11) (0.43) (0.74) (0.85) (0.11) 
1 year before 954.992 1460.89 274.917 101.165 642.641 –594.708 
  (0.88) (0.85) (0.25) (0.12) (0.50) (0.65) 
Year of –1794.67 –415.857 –3846.44 –971.176 –517.565 –1698.95 
  (1.82)* (0.28) (3.23)*** (1.15) (0.43) (1.44) 
1 year after –4189.47 –1112.62 –8682.58 –2462.71 –1563.33 –3889.66 
  (3.41)*** (0.58) (7.00)*** (2.62)*** (1.08) (3.59)*** 
2 years after –5491.12 –2486.19 –10 029.08 –3350.88 2309.10 –5138.35 
  (5.44)*** (1.72)* (7.52)*** (4.28)*** (2.19)** (4.33)*** 
3 years after –3828.76 –814.07 –8652.68 –2473.47 –1670.33 –4082.20 
  (3.41)*** (0.49) (6.60)*** (2.92)*** (1.43) (3.42)*** 
4 years after –5781.23 –2155.27 –11 644.20 –3295.69 –2829.64 –4616.02 
  (5.25)*** (1.43) (7.64)*** (3.40)*** (2.70)*** (2.57)** 
5 years after –4047.06 –45.939 –10 972.50 –2813.72 –869.919 –6499.53 
  (3.03)*** (0.02) (7.71)*** (2.90)*** (0.62) (5.48)*** 
6 years after –5243.86 –1081.65 –12 458.99 –4295.50 –2127.27 –8396.72 
  (4.20)*** (0.67) (6.56)*** (4.77)*** (1.82)* (6.07)*** 
7 years after –3511.89 439.572 –11 094.21 –1363.92 –682.565 –3404.35 
  (2.51)** (0.22) (6.82)*** (0.90) (0.47) (1.06) 
8 years after –4785.89 –153.885 –13 456.46 –3718.18 –1353.56 –8591.51 
  (4.48)*** (0.11) (8.63)*** (3.87)*** (1.04) (6.43)*** 
9 years after –3322.01 53.389 –10 342.07 –3437.52 –1753.74 –7490.71 
  (2.34)** (0.03) (5.12)*** (3.05)*** (1.30) (3.82)*** 
10 years after –3822.71 –354.433 –11 204.28 –3858.47 –1553.48 –9176.32 
  (2.67)*** (0.18) (6.06)*** (3.42)*** (1.00) (6.31)*** 
Observations 93 494 80 396 75 219 93 494 80 396 75 219 
Number of individuals 6567 5894 5681 6567 5894 5681 
R2 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
All regressions include a quartic in potential experience and year dummy variables. 
Source: Author's calculations from the 1968–2007 PSID. 
 
The estimated earnings and income losses for the least chronically disabled are smaller, in absolute value, when 
compared to those estimates for the entire, all-disabled sample. Furthermore, when focusing on earnings, the 
estimates are statistically insignificant starting 3 years after onset; for income, they are insignificant starting 7 
years afterwards. On the other hand, for the most chronically disabled, earnings and income losses are larger, in 
absolute value, when compared to the entire sample. For example, earnings losses amount to $8683 the year 
after onset and $11 204 10 years afterwards. Income losses the year after onset equal approximately $3890; 10 
years afterwards, the losses amount to $9176. 
The estimates from Table 2 are quantitatively and qualitatively similar to those found in the previous literature. 
Around the year of onset, Stephens (2001), Charles (2003), Meyer and Mok (2006), and Mok et al. (2008) report 
earnings losses ranging from 9% to 49% depending upon the model and sample used. The authors find that 
losses are larger for the more chronically disabled. Stephens (2001) and Meyer and Mok (2006) show income 
losses equalling 7% and 13%, respectively. 10 years after disability onset, Charles (2003), Meyer and Mok (2006), 
and Mok et al. (2008) report earnings losses ranging from 1% to 61%. Stephens (2001) reports a summary 
measure for 6 years or more past disability onset, and he shows that earnings and after-tax family income losses 
equal 20% and 13%, respectively. 
Charles (2003) notes how a reduction in hours, as opposed to hourly earnings, is the driving factor behind the 
large losses to annual earnings. To investigate this issue here, Equation 1 was re-estimated twice using the 
entire sample of disabled and nondisabled men, once with annual hours worked as the dependent variable and 
again with average hourly earnings as the dependent variable. To conserve on space, the results are only 
discussed and available upon request. There is a statistically significant drop, equalling 136, in hours worked 
during the year of onset. 10 years afterwards, the loss in hours is 137. The decline in hourly earnings does not 
become statistically significant until 3 years after disability onset, and it never rises above $3. When the sample 
is restricted to workers only, the loss in hourly earnings does not become significant until the 6th year after 
onset and never rises above $2.50. As in Charles (2003) and Meyer and Mok (2006), the reduction in wages 
tends to grow over time. Therefore, it appears that the large losses to earnings and income observed here are 
driven more by reductions in hours as opposed to wages, which is consistent with the previous literature. 
Recall that family income is used, in addition to labour earnings, since other income sources may mitigate the 
negative impact disability has on the household head’s earnings. In other words, income losses should be 
smaller, in absolute value, than earnings losses. To this end, the difference between the income and earnings 
losses is presented in Table 3. The more positive the number, the more mitigation is being provided. For all 
disabled workers, the results indicate that other sources of income do provide some protection against this 
negative shock to earnings, particularly for the first 4 years after onset. The amount of mitigation differs 
depending upon how chronically disabled the person is. For the least chronically disabled, not only are the 
estimates smaller than those for the overall sample, but also none of the estimates is statistically different from 
zero. The opposite is true for those who are most chronically disabled. Almost all of the differences are larger 
than those for the overall sample, and each post-onset estimate is statistically significant until 10 years after 
onset. While not delineating by chronicity level, Stephens (2001) finds that income losses are smaller than 
earnings losses and notes how transfer payments increase permanently beginning with the year of onset, with 
social security and pension benefit receipts driving the increases. Meyer and Mok (2006) also find income losses 
are smaller than earnings losses and show that private and public transfers play a larger role in mitigating 
earnings losses for those who are most chronically/severely disabled. 
Table 3. Difference between income and earnings losses 
  All disabled Least chronic Most chronic 
3 years before –339.05 –801.02 310.68 
2 years before –456.82 –507.76 –346.56 
1 year before –853.83 –818.25 –869.63 
Year of 823.50 –101.71 2147.50** 
1 year after 1726.76** –450.72 4792.92*** 
2 years after 2140.24*** 177.09 4890.74*** 
3 years after 1355.29* –856.26 4570.49*** 
4 years after 2485.54*** –674.37 7028.18*** 
5 years after 1233.34 –823.98 4472.98*** 
6 years after 948.35 –1,045.62 4062.27*** 
7 years after 2147.97 –1,122.14 7689.86** 
8 years after 1067.70 –1,199.67 4864.95*** 
9 years after –115.52 –1,807.13 2851.36* 
10 years after –35.76 –1,199.05 2027.96 
Notes: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
Significance tests conducted using Wald test. 
Source: Author's calculations from the 1968–2007 PSID. 
 
Disability and inter-temporal mobility 
Tables 4 and 5 present the transition probabilities by disability status for the labour earnings and family income 
distributions, respectively. The rows in each table show the associated movement within each distribution. For 
example, the row labelled ‘Up 4’ indicates an upward movement of four quintiles within the distribution. Each 
calculation comes from Equation 2, and it shows the proportion of men who make that particular movement in 
relation to the number of individuals capable of making the transition (Burkhauser et al., 1997; Jolly, 2013). 
Therefore, column totals will not sum to 100%. The columns labelled t = −3 to r indicate the end period of the 
transition. For example, when focusing on all disabled men, the column t = −3 to –2 indicates the movement 
from 3 years before onset to 2 years before onset. The entries in bold indicate a statistical difference at the 10% 
level or better between that particular sample and the one immediately to the left of it. 
Table 4. Transition probabilities by disability status – labour earnings distribution 
  t = –3 to 
–2 
  t = –3 to 
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Up 4 1.91% 2.28% 4.20% 3.97% 5.52% 8.28% 7.34% 4.00% 5.61% 10.41% 3.07% 3.69% 
Up 3 1.75% 2.76% 1.61% 5.63% 1.42% 2.10% 4.88% 2.69% 1.86% 7.54% 2.67% 1.63% 
Up 2 4.53% 2.73% 3.34% 7.41% 7.28% 7.86% 11.17% 5.87% 5.85% 10.24% 7.51% 5.23% 
Up 1 20.50% 18.77% 18.25% 23.25% 16.49% 10.38% 25.81% 18.99% 15.18% 27.39% 17.16% 10.82% 
Immobile 64.82% 63.17% 59.60% 58.70% 55.67% 53.56% 53.08% 48.19% 45.19% 50.48% 45.01% 38.27% 
Down 1 15.24% 17.45% 20.24% 14.37% 21.98% 27.82% 15.08% 24.08% 26.99% 15.36% 22.41% 31.19% 
Down 2 3.45% 3.90% 5.86% 4.38% 6.84% 8.20% 5.73% 9.67% 12.85% 4.86% 11.37% 16.60% 
Down 3 1.91% 3.10% 3.20% 3.03% 4.25% 4.42% 2.61% 8.08% 14.93% 4.53% 14.75% 25.82% 
Down 4 0.34% 2.55% 3.20% 3.17% 4.48% 8.06% 2.87% 9.53% 11.09% 3.81% 15.49% 23.43% 
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Up 4 9.50% 5.54% 6.23% 10.90% 3.34% 4.15% 19.84% 5.61% 3.43% 22.09% 5.17% 4.31% 
Up 3 8.67% 3.93% 4.19% 10.87% 5.99% 5.74% 11.18% 4.19% 3.31% 8.81% 3.18% 1.91% 
Up 2 12.24% 6.54% 3.68% 12.53% 9.84% 5.25% 15.95% 7.35% 5.45% 15.90% 10.37% 7.79% 
Up 1 30.61% 17.41% 11.94% 29.86% 18.77% 14.51% 30.29% 19.89% 15.73% 29.70% 16.11% 9.91% 
Immobile 46.45% 43.82% 40.67% 46.36% 41.13% 36.98% 42.47% 40.07% 34.94% 39.95% 44.12% 40.85% 
Down 1 15.09% 22.72% 25.99% 13.22% 22.03% 26.24% 15.21% 21.25% 25.47% 15.59% 18.98% 20.06% 
Down 2 6.26% 12.55% 19.27% 5.86% 11.90% 19.18% 5.91% 15.09% 22.08% 6.95% 14.96% 25.69% 
Down 3 3.22% 13.53% 24.69% 5.19% 14.03% 23.78% 3.50% 16.66% 27.88% 6.36% 14.00% 26.39% 
Down 4 4.29% 17.60% 20.19% 9.32% 16.79% 21.93% 6.99% 15.40% 23.56% 10.15% 19.25% 29.18% 
Notes: Weighted transition probabilities by disability status. The all disabled columns indicate any male who reports a disability. The most chronic 
columns indicate an individual with a chronicity weight greater than or equal to 0.5. For the disabled group, time is relative to three years prior to onset. 
For the non-disabled, time is relative to a randomly chosen starting date. Entries in bold indicate a statistical difference between the group and the one 
in the column to the left at a 10% level when using a two-tailed test. 
Source: 1968 through 2007 waves of the PSID. 
Table 4 indicates that there are two general patterns exhibited by both disabled and nondisabled men. First, the 
proportion of men who are immobile within the earnings distribution decreases over time. For example, the 
proportion of nondisabled, immobile individuals in column t = −3 to –2 is 65%. In column t = −3 to 5, the 
proportion is approximately 40%. The analogous numbers for all disabled men are 63% and 44%, respectively. 
The most chronically disabled have proportions of 59% and 41%, respectively. The second pattern is that the 
probability of changing quintiles grows over time. The percentage of nondisabled men who move up four 
quintiles in column t = −3 to –2 is approximately 2%. In column t = −3 to 5, the proportion equals 22%. The 
percentages are 2% and 5% for all work-disabled individuals. Since the probability of changing quintiles increases 
as time progresses, earnings shocks tend to persist for all groups. 
Despite these similarities, Table 4 shows that the number of statistical differences between all disabled and 
nondisabled men increases substantially starting in column t = −3 to 0. Recall that for the disabled, column t = −3 
to 0 represents the transition from 3 years before onset to the year of onset. During the year of onset, disabled 
men have significantly lower probabilities of rising in the labour earnings distribution and significantly higher 
probabilities of falling in the distribution. For example, the proportion of all disabled men who fall three 
quintiles in the earnings distribution is 8%; the proportion of nondisabled individuals is only 3%. The proportion 
of all disabled men moving up three quintiles is 3%, and the same for the nondisabled is approximately 5%. 
Furthermore, these differences remain throughout the rest of the table. This indicates that even 5 years after 
the onset of the disability, individuals’ intragenerational mobility is worse when compared to their nondisabled 
counterparts.13 
Table 4 also indicates that the most chronically disabled have worse mobility patterns than the disabled sample 
as a whole starting in column t = −3 to 1. Specifically, the proportion of most chronically disabled men falling 
three quintiles equals approximately 26%, while for the entire disabled sample, the proportion is only 15%. The 
percentages for moving up one quintile are 11% and 17% for the most chronically disabled and the entire 
disabled sample, respectively. 
The results in Table 5 have many similarities to those presented in Table 4. Specifically, the two general mobility 
patterns are present: all three subgroups have declining probabilities of immobility and growing probabilities of 
changing quintiles. Additionally, the number of statistical differences between the all disabled/nondisabled and 
the most chronically disabled/all-disabled sample increase in column t = −3 to 1. Again, disabled men have lower 
probabilities of rising, and larger probabilities of falling, in the family income distribution. Further, the most 
chronically disabled have slightly lower probabilities of rising, and larger probabilities of falling, in the 
distribution when compared to the entire sample of disabled workers. 
Table 5. Transition probabilities by disability status – family income distribution 
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Up 4 1.34% 0.78% 0.00% 4.20% 1.47% 1.11% 7.24% 0.45% 0.99% 6.26% 0.14% 0.00% 
Up 3 3.21% 1.61% 3.29% 4.31% 3.48% 4.60% 5.03% 3.62% 1.99% 7.33% 5.33% 4.58% 
Up 2 5.31% 5.08% 5.01% 9.74% 6.46% 5.74% 14.09% 10.23% 12.29% 13.61% 10.48% 11.18% 
Up 1 21.78% 22.09% 20.41% 24.52% 24.30% 22.36% 27.14% 24.96% 22.69% 29.96% 21.52% 14.86% 
Immobile 59.81% 59.12% 58.58% 53.88% 53.11% 51.99% 47.53% 48.16% 44.80% 47.74% 45.10% 44.84% 
Down 1 17.62% 17.23% 19.03% 18.38% 17.87% 20.20% 18.97% 20.44% 24.82% 16.12% 23.25% 26.74% 
Down 2 5.31% 6.62% 6.90% 5.68% 8.11% 10.86% 5.97% 7.55% 7.53% 6.69% 10.38% 14.32% 
Down 3 1.59% 2.05% 1.32% 2.13% 4.14% 2.00% 2.23% 5.45% 8.50% 2.77% 7.27% 9.07% 
Down 4 0.45% 0.00% 0.00% 1.60% 0.51% 0.00% 0.27% 1.09% 0.00% 0.90% 1.22% 0.10% 
  t = –3 to 
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Up 4 6.43% 3.51% 5.03% 8.05% 5.52% 5.08% 11.97% 4.50% 5.26% 19.35% 3.71% 2.79% 
Up 3 5.56% 4.59% 2.49% 12.06% 3.43% 3.69% 7.42% 5.44% 3.94% 10.77% 4.97% 3.84% 
Up 2 16.86% 9.76% 9.84% 17.15% 11.53% 9.03% 21.87% 15.51% 17.53% 21.00% 16.03% 12.57% 
Up 1 32.34% 30.01% 24.36% 32.29% 27.75% 23.62% 30.53% 29.74% 24.95% 31.92% 28.10% 24.24% 
Immobile 44.83% 39.98% 39.88% 43.19% 39.51% 37.00% 40.90% 34.34% 32.08% 38.53% 37.65% 36.52% 
Down 1 15.09% 20.15% 23.07% 15.61% 20.89% 23.71% 16.09% 20.53% 21.78% 15.53% 19.38% 22.34% 
Down 2 5.64% 12.51% 15.70% 6.07% 13.73% 19.23% 5.70% 12.40% 17.50% 6.51% 12.82% 21.70% 
Down 3 2.71% 5.43% 7.72% 2.40% 6.52% 12.16% 2.57% 8.08% 12.55% 4.40% 5.10% 2.95% 
Down 4 1.23% 4.04% 6.84% 2.94% 1.07% 0.00% 2.98% 5.75% 7.11% 2.17% 5.07% 8.70% 
Notes: Weighted transition probabilities by disability status. The all disabled columns indicate any male who reports a disability. The most chronic 
columns indicate an individual with a chronicity weight greater than or equal to 0.5. For the disabled group, time is relative to three years prior to onset. 
For the non-disabled, time is relative to a randomly chosen starting date. Entries in bold indicate a statistical difference between the group and the one 
in the column to the left at a 10% level when using a two-tailed test. 
Source: 1968 through 2007 waves of the PSID. 
Despite the similarities between Tables 4 and 5, there are some differences worth noting. First, the number of 
statistical differences between the disabled and nondisabled does not increase in Table 5 as much as it does 
in Table 4. Thus, while the onset of a work-limiting disability does hinder a worker’s intragenerational income 
mobility, the shock does not appear to be as severe as it is for labour earnings. This provides some evidence that 
spousal labour earnings and government transfer payments provide partial mitigation of the disability’s adverse 
mobility effects. 
Second, even though the chronically disabled tend to have higher probabilities of falling, and lower probabilities 
of rising, in the income distribution when compared to the entire disabled sample, the number of statistical 
differences is not as numerous in Table 5 when compared to Table 4. This could be caused by the fact that men 
who are more chronically disabled work less than the sample, on average. In fact, during the 5 years after onset, 
the most chronically disabled average 1304 annual hours of work, whereas the entire disabled sample works 
1734 annual hours. Therefore, the chronically disabled may qualify for more transfer programmes or larger 
payouts when compared to the rest of the disabled sample. This would cause fewer statistical differences to be 
present between the two groups. 
Placement in the earnings and income distributions 
Table 6 shows the results from estimating the likelihood function of the interval regression. Tables 2 and 6 are 
interpreted similarly. In other words, the estimates presented in Table 6 show the impact a work-limiting 
disability has on an individual’s earnings and income. There are times when the results in Tables 2 and 6 differ. 
This is particularly true for the most chronically disabled and the post-onset years four and above. Generally, the 
results in Table 2 are larger during the pre-onset years and smaller during the post-onset years when compared 
to Table 6. Differences between the estimates are expected since the models employed for each table are 
different. Recall that the results in Table 2 come from a standard, linear fixed-effects model. The results in Table 
6 come from an interval regression, which uses a different methodology to account for individual fixed effects. 
Furthermore, the linear regression uses the actual observation for earnings and income, whereas interval 
regression uses interval-coded earnings and income data. What is more important, however, is that both sets of 
estimates present the same qualitative findings, not only in terms of trend, but also in regards to statistical 
significance. Additionally, both sets of estimates are similar to those found in the previous literature 
(Stephens, 2001; Charles, 2003; Meyer and Mok, 2006; Mok et al., 2008). 
Table 6. Interval regressions by chronicity 
  Labour 
earnings 
  Family 
income 
  








3 years before 1509.22 1480.12 1633.92 904.134 373.671 1687.22 
  (2.71)*** (2.11)** (1.81)* (1.93)* (0.62) (2.30)** 
2 years before 1051.38 893.543 1487.16 199.421 –268.908 976.909 
  (1.85)* (1.22) (1.68)* (0.44) (0.46) (1.35) 
1 year before –18.369 67.724 15.007 165.316 –55.899 529.97 
  (0.03) (0.09) (0.02) (0.35) (0.09) (0.74) 
Year of –2333.31 –1390.25 –3604.68 –1042.54 –980.721 –1127.45 
  (3.88)*** (1.84)* (3.72)*** (2.27)** (1.63) (1.60) 
1 year after –4855.33 –2183.41 –8985.85 –2523.96 –1970.28 –3431.70 
  (7.19)*** (2.63)*** (8.02)*** (4.93)*** (2.98)*** (4.28)*** 
2 years after –4815.36 –2399.77 –8703.04 –2702.69 –1858.65 –4080.05 
  (7.25)*** (2.93)*** (7.82)*** (5.44)*** (2.90)*** (5.19)*** 
3 years after –3747.52 –932.633 –8591.96 –2098.41 –1317.11 –3572.16 
  (5.34)*** (1.09) (7.19)*** (3.95)*** (1.95)* (4.17)*** 
4 years after –4636.85 –1616.92 –10 032.00 –2095.08 –1167.75 –3796.55 
  (6.49)*** (1.85)* (8.29)*** (3.92)*** (1.76)* (4.30)*** 
5 years after –4324.30 –1625.72 –9798.57 –2407.96 –1423.53 –4475.17 
  (5.79)*** (1.83)* (7.38)*** (4.26)*** (1.99)** (4.90)*** 
6 years after –4009.84 –975.336 –9893.54 –2444.62 –1235.06 –4875.71 
  (5.32)*** (1.10) (7.39)*** (4.30)*** (1.73)* (5.19)*** 
7 years after –3398.04 79.148 –10 967.36 –1095.01 116.208 –3777.22 
  (4.16)*** (0.08) (7.29)*** (1.82)* (0.15) (3.87)*** 
8 years after –3509.07 879.839 –12 731.02 –1723.78 –8.175 –5301.84 
  (4.45)*** (0.95) (8.84)*** (2.83)*** (0.01) (5.34)*** 
9 years after –3037.28 37.187 –10 255.14 –1900.33 –116.669 –5689.00 
  (3.62)*** (0.04) (6.56)*** (3.15)*** (0.15) (5.72)*** 
10 years after –2901.30 7.677 –9943.00 –1958.68 –193.847 –6023.96 
  (3.45)*** (0.01) (6.41)*** (3.23)*** (0.25) (6.05)*** 
Observations 93 494 80 396 75 219 93 494 80 396 75 219 
Number of 
individuals 
6567 5894 5681 6567 5894 5681 
Notes: Robust z statistics in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
All regresions include a quartic in potential experience, year dummy variables, and time averages of the 
experience, time, and disability variables. 
Source: Author’s calculations from the 1968–2007 PSID. 
 
Focusing on all disabled men, the results in Table 6 indicate that both earnings and income drop significantly 
during the year of disability onset. Labour earnings drop by $2333, and family income declines by $1043. The 
earnings and income losses tend to grow slightly. 10 years after onset, earnings losses are $2901 and lost 
income amounts to $1959. The earnings and income losses for the least chronically disabled are much smaller in 
absolute value when compared to the entire sample. Furthermore, the estimates are statistically insignificant 
starting 6 years after onset with labour earnings and 7 years after onset with family income. Those individuals 
who are most chronically disabled tend to have larger earnings and income losses when compared to the entire 
sample. The income losses tend to be smaller than the earnings losses for all three samples, which indicates that 
other sources of income tend to mitigate any adverse effect disability has on labour earnings. Additionally, the 
gap between income and earnings losses is largest for the most chronically disabled. Again, this provides 
evidence that other sources of income offer more protection against disability’s adverse impact for those who 
experience more chronic disabilities as noted in Meyer and Mok (2006). 
The point of the interval regressions is to use the estimates in Equation 4 to calculate the marginal effect the 
onset of a disability has on being in any one of the five quintiles of the distributions. Tables 7 and 8 provide 
those estimated marginal effects. Table 7 shows the calculations for the labour earnings distribution, and Table 
8 presents the estimates for the family income distribution. Each table contains three panels. Panel A shows the 
marginal effects for all of the disabled, Panel B presents the estimates for the least chronically disabled, and 
Panel C shows the estimates for the most chronically disabled. 
Concentrating on Panel A of Table 7, the results show that a disabled worker’s probability of being in the bottom 
quintile of the labour earnings distribution is 5% points higher than that of a nondisabled worker during the year 
after onset. 10 years afterwards, the probability is almost 3% points higher. When looking at the top quintile, 
the results are of similar size, but opposite sign. The magnitude of the effect decreases when moving from the 
tails to the centre of the distribution. The year after onset, disabled workers are 0.38% points more likely to be 
in the third quintile when compared to their nondisabled counterparts. The cumulative effect that disability has 
on being in particular portions of the distribution is obtained by horizontally summing the rows. The year after 
onset, disabled workers are 7% points more likely to be in the bottom two quintiles of the labour earnings 
distribution. 10 years afterwards, the increased probability is 4% points. 
Table 7. Marginal effects on probability of placement in earnings distribution 
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5 
Panel A: all disabled      
 3 years before –1.41%*** –0.72%*** –0.26%** 0.61%*** 1.78%*** 
 2 years before –0.99%* –0.50%* –0.18%* 0.43%* 1.23%* 
 1 year before 0.02% 0.01% 0.00% –0.01% –0.02% 
 Year of 2.35%*** 1.05%*** 0.27%*** –1.09%*** –2.58%*** 
 1 year after 5.11%*** 2.08%*** 0.38%*** –2.43%*** –5.15%*** 
 2 years after 5.07%*** 2.07%*** 0.38%*** –2.41%*** –5.11%*** 
 3 years after 3.87%*** 1.64%*** 0.36%*** –1.82%*** –4.05%*** 
 4 years after 4.87%*** 2.00%*** 0.38%*** –2.31%*** –4.93%*** 
 5 years after 4.51%*** 1.87%*** 0.37%*** –2.13%*** –4.63%*** 
 6 years after 4.16%*** 1.75%*** 0.37%*** –1.96%*** –4.31%*** 
 7 years after 3.49%*** 1.50%*** 0.34%*** –1.63%*** –3.70%*** 
 8 years after 3.61%*** 1.55%*** 0.35%*** –1.69%*** –3.81%*** 
 9 years after 3.10%*** 1.35%*** 0.32%*** –1.44%*** –3.32%*** 
 10 years after 2.95%*** 1.29%*** 0.31%*** –1.37%*** –3.18%*** 
Panel B: least chronic      
 3 years before –1.38%** –0.73%** –0.27%* 0.63%** 1.75%** 
 2 years before –0.84% –0.44% –0.15% 0.39% 1.05% 
 1 year before –0.07% –0.03% –0.01% 0.03% 0.08% 
 Year of 1.38%* 0.66%* 0.19%** –0.66%* –1.57%* 
 1 year after 2.20%** 1.03%*** 0.27%*** –1.06%** –2.43%*** 
 2 years after 2.42%*** 1.12%*** 0.29%*** –1.17%*** –2.66%*** 
 3 years after 0.91% 0.45% 0.13% –0.43% –1.06% 
 4 years after 1.61%* 0.77%* 0.22%* –0.77%* –1.82%* 
 5 years after 1.62%* 0.77%* 0.22%* –0.78%* –1.83%* 
 6 years after 0.96% 0.47% 0.14% –0.46% –1.11% 
 7 years after –0.08% –0.04% –0.01% 0.04% 0.09% 
 8 years after –0.83% –0.43% –0.15% 0.38% 1.03% 
 9 years after –0.04% –0.02% –0.01% 0.02% 0.04% 
 10 years after –0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 
Panel C: most chronic      
 3 years before –1.54%* –0.79%* –0.28% 0.69%* 1.92%* 
 2 years before –1.40%* –0.72%* –0.25% 0.63%* 1.74% 
 1 year before –0.01% –0.01% 0.00% 0.01% 0.02% 
 Year of 3.76%*** 1.61%*** 0.33%*** –1.82%*** –3.88%*** 
 1 year after 10.27%*** 3.52%*** 0.05% –5.11%*** –8.73%*** 
 2 years after 9.90%*** 3.44%*** 0.09% –4.93%*** –8.50%*** 
 3 years after 9.76%*** 3.40%*** 0.10% –4.85%*** –8.41%*** 
 4 years after 11.66%*** 3.81%*** –0.11% –5.80%*** –9.54%*** 
 5 years after 11.34%*** 3.74%*** –0.07% –5.65%*** –9.37%*** 
 6 years after 11.47%*** 3.77%*** –0.09% –5.71%*** –9.44%*** 
 7 years after 12.92%*** 4.03%*** –0.28% –6.43%*** –10.24%*** 
 8 years after 15.38%*** 4.39%*** –0.68%* –7.64%*** –11.46%*** 
 9 years after 11.95%*** 3.86%*** –0.15% –5.95%*** –9.71%*** 
 10 years after 11.54%*** 3.78%*** –0.10% –5.74%*** –9.48%*** 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
The estimates are calculated using the parameter estimates from the interval regressions. All variables are set to 
their mean levels except for the disability variables. Those are set to zero when calculating the marginal effects. 
 
Panel B of Table 7 indicates that the negative impact disability has on the least chronically disabled is much 
smaller than that for the entire sample. The opposite is true for those who are most chronically disabled. 
Overall, the results in Table 7 indicate that a disability not only increases the probability of downward earnings 
mobility during the year of onset, but it also decreases the probability of upward mobility for at least 10 years 
after the onset occurs. This finding is more pronounced for those who are most chronically disabled. 
Table 8 presents the marginal effects for the family income distribution. Qualitatively, the results are similar to 
those in Table 7. Specifically, the onset of a disability is associated with an increased probability of being in the 
bottom of the distribution and a decreased probability of being the in top of the distribution. The magnitude of 
the effects decreases when moving from the tails to the centre of the distribution, and the impact of a disability 
is larger for the most chronically disabled. The difference between Tables 7 and 8 is that the magnitude of the 
estimates is generally smaller in Table 8. For example, a disabled worker (Panel A) is 4% points more likely to be 
in the bottom two quintiles of the family income distribution the year after onset when compared to a 
nondisabled worker. 10 years after onset, the increased probability is 3% points. Again, this provides some 
evidence that other income sources offer protection against the negative impact that disability has on an 
individual’s placement within the distribution. 
Table 8. Marginal effects on probability of placement in the income distribution 
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5 
Panel A: all disabled      
 3 years before –1.07%** –0.43%* –0.20%* 0.49%** 1.20%* 
 2 years before –0.24% –0.09% –0.04% 0.11% 0.26% 
 1 year before –0.20% –0.08% –0.03% 0.09% 0.22% 
 Year of 1.28%** 0.47%** 0.18%** –0.61%** –1.33%** 
 1 year after 3.21%*** 1.11%*** 0.37%*** –1.57%*** –3.12%*** 
 2 years after 3.44%*** 1.19%*** 0.38%*** –1.69%*** –3.33%*** 
 3 years after 2.64%*** 0.93%*** 0.32%*** –1.28%*** –2.62%*** 
 4 years after 2.64%*** 0.93%*** 0.32%*** –1.28%*** –2.61%*** 
 5 years after 3.05%*** 1.07%*** 0.36%*** –1.49%*** –2.98%*** 
 6 years after 3.10%*** 1.08%*** 0.36%*** –1.51%*** –3.03%*** 
 7 years after 1.35%* 0.50%* 0.19%** –0.64%* –1.39%* 
 8 years after 2.15%*** 0.77%*** 0.28%*** –1.04%*** –2.17%*** 
 9 years after 2.38%*** 0.85%*** 0.30%*** –1.15%*** –2.38%*** 
 10 years after 2.46%*** 0.88%*** 0.31%*** –1.19%*** –2.45%*** 
Panel B: least chronic      
 3 years before –0.44% –0.18% –0.08% 0.21% 0.49% 
 2 years before 0.32% 0.13% 0.05% –0.16% –0.35% 
 1 year before 0.07% 0.03% 0.01% –0.03% –0.07% 
 Year of 1.20% 0.46%* 0.18%* –0.59% –1.26%* 
 1 year after 2.47%*** 0.91%*** 0.33%*** –1.23%*** –2.48%*** 
 2 years after 2.32%*** 0.86%*** 0.31%*** –1.15%*** –2.34%*** 
 3 years after 1.63%* 0.62%** 0.24%** –0.80%* –1.68%** 
 4 years after 1.44%* 0.55%* 0.21%** –0.71%* –1.49%* 
 5 years after 1.76%* 0.66%** 0.25%** –0.87%* –1.81%** 
 6 years after 1.52%* 0.58%* 0.23%** –0.75%* –1.58%* 
 7 years after –0.14% –0.06% –0.02% 0.07% 0.15% 
 8 years after 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% –0.01% 
 9 years after 0.14% 0.06% 0.02% –0.07% –0.15% 
 10 years after 0.23% 0.09% 0.04% –0.11% –0.25% 
Panel C: most chronic      
 3 years before –1.97%** –0.81%** –0.39%** 0.90%** 2.26%** 
 2 years before –1.16% –0.46% –0.21% 0.54% 1.29% 
 1 year before –0.63% –0.25% –0.11% 0.30% 0.70% 
 Year of 1.40% 0.52% 0.19%* –0.68% –1.43% 
 1 year after 4.46%*** 1.49%*** 0.42%*** –2.24%*** –4.14%*** 
 2 years after 5.38%*** 1.75%*** 0.45%*** –2.71%*** –4.86%*** 
 3 years after 4.66%*** 1.55%*** 0.43%*** –2.34%*** –4.30%*** 
 4 years after 4.97%*** 1.64%*** 0.44%*** –2.50%*** –4.55%*** 
 5 years after 5.94%*** 1.90%*** 0.45%*** –3.01%*** –5.28%*** 
 6 years after 6.52%*** 2.04%*** 0.45%*** –3.31%*** –5.70%*** 
 7 years after 4.95%*** 1.63%*** 0.44%*** –2.49%*** –4.53%*** 
 8 years after 7.15%*** 2.19%*** 0.44%*** –3.64%*** –6.14%*** 
 9 years after 7.73%*** 2.33%*** 0.42%*** –3.95%*** –6.53%*** 
 10 years after 8.23%*** 2.44%*** 0.40%*** –4.22%*** –6.86%*** 
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
The estimates are calculated using the parameter estimates from the interval regressions. All variables are set to 
their mean levels except for the disability variables. Those are set to zero when calculating the marginal effects. 
 
The results from this and the previous subsection help advance the literature on how work-limiting disabilities 
influence intragenerational mobility. The results here are not directly comparable to those found in the earlier 
literature because of differences in data and methodology. This article uses the panel structure of the PSID and 
traces mobility patterns over a 14 year period. The earnings equations and interval regressions explicitly use a 
comparison group of nondisabled individuals. Nagi and Hadley (1972) use data from applicants for disability 
benefits, two period transition matrices and no comparison group. Bartley and Plewis (1997) use data from 
England and Wales, focus on socio-economic status defined by occupational classifications and examine mobility 
over three separate 10 year periods. Meyer and Mok (2006) use the PSID; however, they calculate poverty rates. 
Burkhauser et al. (2008) use data from the CPS, kernel density estimates, and, while the authors compare 
different groups of individuals, they do not explicitly use comparison groups in their econometric modelling. 
While the results here are not directly comparable, they do support the results, mentioned in the introduction, 
of the previous literature. Additionally, they show what DeLeire (2000), among many others, notes: people with 
disabilities tend to work and earn less than their nondisabled counterparts. They also tend to be older, less 
educated and come from blue-collar occupations and they may be less productive and/or face substantial 
barriers in the labour market. 
IV. Conclusions 
This article uses the 1968–2007 waves of the PSID to investigate the effect a work-limiting disability has on an 
individual’s intragenerational earnings and income mobility. Results from the analysis indicate that disabled men 
tend to be relatively disadvantaged when compared to their nondisabled counterparts. They are older, less 
educated, African-American and come from blue-collar occupations. Disabled individuals also tend to work and 
earn less. Furthermore, the analysis shows that the onset of a work-limiting disability is associated with a large 
drop in labour earnings and family income. These earnings and income losses barely recover even after 10 years 
following the onset of the disability and are larger for the most chronically disabled. 
The analysis is extended to show that the deep earnings and income losses associated with a work-limiting 
disability negatively influence a worker’s mobility through the distributions. During the year of onset, workers 
have significantly higher probabilities of falling and lower probabilities of rising in the distribution. This change in 
probabilities lasts for several years after onset. Additionally, disabled individuals have much larger probabilities 
of being in the bottom two quintiles of the earnings and income distributions relative to the nondisabled, with 
results being more pronounced for the most chronically disabled individuals. 
Overall, the results indicate that work-disabled men are substantially worse off than their nondisabled 
counterparts are. This is particularly the case for those with more chronic or severe disabilities. Other sources of 
income do offer some protection against disability’s negative impacts, with more protection being offered for 
the more chronically disabled. However, those individuals experiencing a work-limiting disability still have a 
difficult time climbing through the income distribution. This occurs despite the substantial growth of enrolment 
in and payments from transfer programmes such as SSDI and SSI. This provides evidence that existing safety nets 
are not filling enough of the gap that is left by lost labour earnings associated with the onset of a work-limiting 
disability. 
Notes 
1 Meyer and Mok (2006) note that in 2005, SSDI benefits amounted to $85.4 billion and SSI expenditures for the 
blind and disabled amounted to $34.4 billion. 
2 An analysis of the effect that disability insurance has on labour force participation decisions is beyond the 
scope of this article. For thorough discussions, see Autor and Duggan (2003). 
3 While Meyer and Mok (2006) do use a similar earnings equation when estimating earnings and income losses, 
they do not use such a technique in their discussion on poverty rates. Instead, the authors calculate 
poverty rates for individuals over time and around the date of disability onset. 
4 Females are removed to avoid potential labour market adjustments such as child rearing, marriage or divorce 
(Jolly, 2013). 
5 There are potential issues when using a binary, self-report of disability status in regards to the nature of the 
disability and potential biases. A large amount of literature exists that details these issues, and so they 
are not described here. For thorough discussions, see Stern (1989), Stephens (2001), Charles (2003), and 
Benitez-Silva et al. (2004). 
6 The PSID contains a question asking how long an individual has been limited by his health, which could be used 
to time the disability’s onset. This length of limitation question is only available from 1969 to 1975 and 
again in 1978. Stephens (2001) identifies disability onset in a manner that is similar to this article; 
however, he requires individuals to be in the survey 1 year prior to the first report. Charles (2003) uses 
the length  of limitation question when available and the same 2 year window when it is not. The results 
in Stephens (2001) and Charles (2003) are very similar. Therefore, to be consistent with identifying onset 
dates here, the limiting question is not used. 
7 Charles (2003) defines chronicity in a similar manner. However, instead of creating a weight, he counts the 
number of post-onset reports. Charles (2003) finds that men who report a work-limiting disability in 
every subsequent year are more likely to receive worker’s compensation and have relatively severe 
functional limitations, such as problems bathing and dressing. Therefore, even though this index 
accounts for how chronic the disability is, it is reasonable to expect that the larger is the index, the more 
severe is the disability. 
8 Charles (2003) uses a similar equation where he includes an additional term to account for individual-specific 
trends in earnings. 
9 From 1968 to 1993, the PSID bottom-coded family income so that negative values were not reported. Starting 
in 1994, the bottom-coding was removed and negative values of family income were recorded. To 
maintain consistency, all negative reports of family income were bottom-coded at $1. 
10 The reason nominal figures are converted to 2006 dollars is that earnings and income in the PSID refer to the 
previous calendar year. Since 2007 is the latest survey used, the earnings and income from that year 
refer to the calendar year 2006. 
11 Additional control variables used include the number of children under 18 in the household, a dummy 
variable for marital status, the wife’s age and dummy variables for workers in the manufacturing 
industry and those working in blue-collar occupations. The  quantitative results are only slightly changed 
with these additional variables and are available upon request. 
12 This is similar to Jolly (2013). The analysis here focuses on changing quintiles, whereas in Jolly (2013), the 
focus was on changing deciles in the distributions. 
13 To conserve on space, mobility patterns are only tracked until the 5th year after onset for the three groups 
presented. Tables showing mobility patterns for all groups  until the 10th year after onset are available 
upon request. 
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